guesses from Colquhoun's and Baxter's nineteenth-century social tables. There is currently no independent set of information for checking the social tables' guesses about the relative incomes or wealth of capitalists or of those large self-employed middling groups: shopkeepers, farmers, yeomen, and husbandmen. To discover whether capitalists gained ground on persons of landed title or whether yeomen and others became more proletarianized, we need a data source sampling these groups heavily, a source that also allows us to construct an overall size distribution of income or wealth.
This study quadruples the length of our historical view of the distribution of English wealth and property income. The long period from a preindustrial 1670 to the onset of satisfactory published data in 1911 is spanned with the help of newly processed data on probated wealth, landownership, debts, and occupation.
Careful handling of the data yields six kinds of results.
(1) The social strata moved further apart in their average personal wealth (excluding real estate) between 1740 and 1875. Merchants and persons of landed title accumulated wealth (and gained income) much faster than the rest of society over this era of Industrial Revolution. Middling groups, such as yeomen, shopkeepers, and craftsmen, accumulated less. The classic image of widening class inequality does fit these wealth-by-class movements. Yet the middling classes did gain in real wealth and income and were not replaced by any rising share of more proletarian occupations. (2) Wealth other than real estate, or gross "personal estate," became more unequally held during the Industrial Revolution era, within each region studied as well as in the national estimates. (3) When the distributions of personal estate, real estate, and debts are combined, the resulting distributions of net worth show a high level of wealth inequality in Victorian England. They do not, however, show that it had increased over the two preceding centuries as Victorian critics had implied, even though the ownership of individual types of assets had become more concentrated. (4) Shifts in age distribution played minor roles in the observed movements in wealth inequality. The shift to a younger adult population contributed to the slight inegalitarian drift from the late seventeenth century to the late nineteenth. The aging of the adult population made only a minor contribution to the pronounced leveling of the wealth distribution in this century. (5) It is possible to reconcile the apparent lack of a trend toward more concentrated net worth before 1875 with the inegalitarian trends in income, personal estate, and even total wealth (including human). The reconciliation rests on the share of wealth or income taken by land, a highly concentrated asset even today. The secular decline in land's share of wealth or income after 1740 gave a more egalitarian twist to the distribution of net worth than it did to income or total wealth because land value has always been a higher share of nonhuman net worth. Since the distributions of income and total wealth are better measures of inequality of living standard than the distribution of nonhuman net worth, the best tentative trend summary about the inequality of English living standards is the Kuznetsian pattern: an inegalitarian trend for the Industrial Revolution era followed by a greater shift toward equality since World War I. (6) Focusing on rents, profit rates, and wage rates as the key to distribution gave the main classical economists some valid insights into the extraordinarily unequal English economy in which they lived. Incomes from rents, profits, and wages were much more segregated across size distribution classes in the nineteenth century than today. The relative neglect of human capital differences as a basis for inequality was less serious in a world in which they accounted for only about 15 percent of national income as compared with about 52 percent for Britain today. Yet their implicit belief that a rise in land rents relative to wage rates meant greater inequality was misleading. Average wealth and income did rise faster for landowners (and capitalists) than for others over the Industrial Revolution era, but the shift of population, income, and wealth away from land was imparting a subtle egalitarian trend even before the classical treatises were written.
II. Data Sets and Estimation Strategy
To measure private wealth in England and Wales before the twentieth century, one must put several kinds of puzzle pieces together. The best starting point is the probate inventory, the only kind of document that consistently measured wealth for persons from all classes above paupers.2 Under ecclesiastical and civil law, English probate appraisers were given consistent instructions to value all personal estate, or "personalty," which was all gross nonhuman assets with one annoying exception: real estate was omitted before 1894, aside from the value of current leases. This study thus begins by estimating the distribution of personalty alone from probate samples, securing some clear initial results about wealth patterns by occupational class and their links to overall inequality. Adding real estate and debts takes some labor and some wide margins of error. For 1873-75, it has been possible to link about half of real estate with individual personal estates, using the estate-multiplier methods described below. Assump-1 132 'JOURNAL OF POLITI CAL ECONOMY tions are added about the other half of' real estate. For earlier dates, realty and personalty are hooked differently, using mean ratios of' the one to the other for each occupational class, as inferred from the probate samples and the revised income tables of' 1688, 1759, 1803, and 1867 (using Lindert and Williamsoni 1982, 1983b) . The resulting view of gross nonhuman wealth is then converted into distributions of net worth with limited information on how debts varied across the classes of gross assets.
The key probate data survive in abundance for England and Wales from the early seventeenth century to the mideighteenth and from 1796 on. For the period 1660-1740, detailed probate inventories survive for about a fifth of all dying household heads.) Church administration of the technical probate requirement then became completely lax, leaving almost no inventories for the late eighteenth century. Then a light probate tax was imposed from 1797 on, remaining below 2 percent even for millionaires until the 1880s (Soward and Willan 1919) .'4 While there is no public access to samples of' detailed inventories from the nineteenth or twentieth centuries, summary calendar entries give names, occupations, estate values, places of' residence, and a few other details for the probate population, which was again nearly a fifth of dying household heads.
To sample probates from the available periods, I have selected four regions and six benchmark dates. The choice of regions is dictated by research convenience and a desire to include regions with varied economic history. The first region, London-Middlesex, could not be avoided in any serious study of English inequality, given the gravita-3 In what follows the population of potential wealth holders will be referred to as "households," meaning males over 20 plus females with stated occupations and widows and spinsters (for 1858 and 1875, just widows and spinsters over 35). Other population concepts are possible, of' course, and tables 3 and 4 below switch to the total adult population in order to match the concept used in most twentieth-century estimates. No attempt has been made here to divide each household's wealth by a measure of' household size or adult consumer equivalents. Doing so would probably reinforce the present conclusions about trends.
. 4 In such low-tax settings, there should also have been little reason to give inter vivos transfers in a way that would confound an attempt to infer the wealth distribution of the living from wealth at death. The mere existence of inter vivos transfers between generations does not impart any bias per se: the more the transfers, the greater the relative wealth of the young, a tendency accurately reflected in an age-adjusted probate sample. A distortion could arise only if the approach of death itself greatly increased inter vivos transfers, perhaps doing so differently for different wealth classes. But in the absence of heavy estate taxes, the main incentive should have been to retain ownership and control until death. One could still fear that high medical costs just before death might make the wealth of decedents a poor measure of the wealth of the living. But this fear also seems misplaced. We all have to go sometime, and the medical costs to be incurred in the approach of death should in fact be deducted from any concept of' the wealth of the living, even if' death is not imminent. Such costs were, in any case, very small before the medical changes of the twentieth century. Converting the probate materials into national distributions of personal estate requires a whole Bayesian strategy for dealing with a wide range of likely errors and biases. Sampling error is the least of our worries: with samples in the thousands, even a 50 percent standard error in wealth appraisal at the level of' the individual gives only a negligible error in aggregate inequality statistics. Much more serious are systematic social biases in the probates and uncertainties about how personalty, realty, and debts were correlated across individuals.
The probate population is a socially biased segment of society, overrepresenting the elderly, the middling agricultural classes, and merchants (Main 1974; Smith 1975; Lindert 1981 ). Most of the social biases can be removed by using the estate-multiplier method to magnify each probate sample cell by its own ratio of true to probate population. This is done here, using large numbers of cells defined by five wealth-determining dimensions (sex, occupation, region, date, and age). But biases may remain. Perhaps the ratio of true living persons to probated persons still varies systematically with wealth within cells, biasing any measure of the mean or dispersion of wealth based on cell magnification alone. Or the numbers of living persons for the different cells may be misestimated.5 Or the wrong multipliers may be assigned to sample regions when trying to synthesize England and Wales from four regions.
So serious are the biases just mentioned, and some lesser obstacles faced below, that a cataloging of the main types of error in the estatemultiplier estimates and the ways of limiting them needs to precede any results. The estimation procedure is detailed in the Appendix and summarized briefly here.
-The occupational distributions of the living, by sex and date, were estimated for England and Wales with wide ranges of error in Lindert (1980) (wpi) are not of equal importance. As noted above, the probate samples are large enough for us to set aside the probate sampling error e-in judging aggregate distributions. The other random error, the ej specific to an individual in the overall population, will also dwindle away in practice. Little true variance is lost by aggregating the living population into groups as numerous as the probated persons, given that the groups are defined by those attributes (sex, occupation, region, date, and age) capturing a high proportion of wealth differences. More formidable is the task of deciding what values to assign to the systematic bias terms, the head count multiples (mi) and the systematic wealth distortions (si). The possible errors here are too special in their likely patterns to submit to classical statistical inference. We must introduce outside (nonsample) information to get confidence interval bounds on the mix's and six's. These bounds must be "conservative" in the sense of yielding defensible outer bounds on inequality statistics. In what follows, wealth inequality will be portrayed by three sets of estimates: too equal estimates virtually certain to understate each wealth inequality parameter, too unequal estimates virtually certain to err in the opposite direction, and preferred, or best-guess, estimates. At several steps in the estimation process,7 detailed in the Appendix, clearly biased assumptions are used in the too equal and too unequal estimates. The combination of several such biases, each in the same too equal or too unequal direction, should suffice to outweigh any other errors that have gone unquantified here. The bounds succeed in being narrow enough to reject many null hypotheses about personal estate in Section III, but in the later sections on net worth, available data leave bounds so wide that most further conclusions are based on best predictions alone, without firm rejection of several competing hypotheses.
III. Unequal Personal Estates, 1670-1875
The procedures sketched above and in the Appendix are first applied to the distribution of personal estate alone, without real estate or debts, before turning to the distribution of overall net worth. While personalty alone is not the most welfare-relevant of wealth measures, it has the advantage of being based on the probate samples, which also yield micro data on sex, region, occupation, and (for 1875) age. Using the more limited wealth measure establishes some patterns that could not have been seen so clearly had I relied solely on tentative measures of net worth or income.
Some 
A. Occupational Gaps
More controversy has surrounded the changing relationship of' wealth to sociooccupational class. The different classes of' England and Wales shared very unequally in the national gains in personal estate. Table 1 and figure 1 reveal that merchants and persons of landed title had accumulated personalty much faster than the rest of society between 1740 and 1875.8 These two classes will continue to stand out, both in wealth level and in rate of accumulation, after we have added real estate and considered debt patterns. The top percentile of household heads consisted almost entirely of titled persons and "merchants" (including financiers and industrialists) throughout the two centuries spanned here. Any explanation of overall inequality movements must include why these two occupational groups, each a slowly declining share of all households, acquired personal wealth so much faster than the rest of society between 1740 and 1875.
The timing of the personal wealth gains of the titled and merchant classes may well have followed the course suggested by figure 1 and table 1. Neither gained much during the relative stagnation and rising taxation of' the late seventeenth century. By 1740, the merchants had gained on the more landed titled class, both in the personal wealth shown here and in their likely realty holdings, as befits a period of' return to relative peace and declining terms of' trade f'or agriculture. The change from 1740 to 1810 accompanied the opposite conditions: a shift to wartime trade barriers, dear food, and rising land rents. Perhaps for these reasons merchants, especially those in London, failed to stand out in the 1810 probates. Across the early and midnineteenth century, these two elites soared above the rest of' society. The gain is particularly pronounced for the merchant group, which is defined to include financiers and industrial capitalists whenever the data gave labels allowing us to separate the latter from other industrial occupations. By the middle of Victoria's reign, the pattern was stark: wealth, and income as well,7' accrued to those who made their living from property itself, far more than to those whose occupational labels bespoke human earnings. The occupational counts in the lower half of table 1 address the possibility that some classes replaced others over the course of these two centuries. The available guesses do not show a rising share of' workers and paupers. Rather their share fell, especially in the nineteenth century. So if the declining share of farmers, yeomen, husbandmen, and shopkeepers found their descendants in another occupational category, the most likely destination would be those industrial trades with similarly middling wealth, not the ranks of poverty. As best as I can tell from personal estate data and from wobbly guesses about the numbers of laborers and paupers, the middle classes could not have sunk in absolute wealth in any net sense. This result will be sustained when I come to the issue of landownership below.
The average wealth of that large laboring class at the bottom of the social ranks is hard to judge from probate data. As mentioned above, very few probate appraisals survive for laborers, and the surviving ones may have been atypical. At face value, the average for laborers in figure 1 shows large improvement between 1740 and 1810 and curious inconsistency of trend in the nineteenth-century figures. The series for laborers cannot be taken at face value, however. Only the 1858 national sample drew a large number of laborers. For the moment, I can say only that the probate results put the laborers on the bottom, as one would expect, with no clear confirmation or contradiction of living standard trends already documented by wage and other data (Lindert and Williamson 1983a).
B. Inequality Movements
The overall inequality in personal estate (still excluding real estate) can now be summarized on the basis of the procedures spelled out above. Of the various summary size distribution measures, the ones used here are the shares of wealth held by the top 1, 5, and 10 percent of the population. Such top quantile shares are less sensitive than other summary measures to estimation errors within the lower reaches of the Lorenz curve, where accuracy is less certain. Wealth will prove so concentrated in England and Wales, especially when all assets and debts are considered, that the shares held by the top 1, 5, and 10 percent suffice to stake out almost the entire Lorenz curve.
The inequality results for personal estate are consistent and robust. The same movements show up in all three types of estimates (preferred, too unequal, and too equal) for all four sample regions and for either men alone or household heads of both sexes together. Table 2 gives the top quantile shares of personal estate. There was no clear trend in the preindustrial era 1670-1740. However, during the Industrial Revolution era, 1740-1858, the gap between the rich and the rest of society widened. The top 1 percent gained enormously, while the share going to the bottom 95 percent dropped. The ratio of the average personal estate of the top 1 percent to that of the bottom 95 percent jumped from 32 in 1740 to 92 in 1858 and 106 in 1875.
The inegalitarian trend in the distribution of personal estate is unmistakable despite the ranges of possible error in each estimate. If one picks any one set of consistent assumptions about estimation biases-the too equal, too unequal, or preferred-the same shift stands out in all regions or (in table 2) for the nation, and for one or both sexes. The only way to pare down the increase in inequality is to imagine that the biases discussed in the Appendix shifted perversely, from too unequal biases toward too equal biases, between 1740 and 1810 and again between 1810 and 1858. Even with such an unlikely perversity, the inequalities of 1858-75 would exceed either those of 1700-1740 or those of the 1970s. Thus far, we seem to have a pattern like the famous Kuznets curve for income inequality (Kuznets 1955) , with the period of rising inequality encompassing the lifetime of Marx.
IV. From Personalty to Net Worth
By focusing on the distribution of personal estate alone, Section III was able to reach clear conclusions about overall inequality and its correlation with gaps in average wealth between the occupational classes. It is likely that our future view of historic trends in the inequality of net worth, total wealth (including human), and income will resemble the trends shown in tables 1 and 2. For the present, however, this pattern will emerge only as a suggestion, without strong confidence bound results, when real estate and debts have been added to personal estate, to develop tentative estimates of how net worth was distributed. Turning to net worth temporarily complicates the view of inequality trends in another way as well: it yields results that seem at first to cancel any trend toward inequality after 1740. This section presents the subtleties of inequality of net worth, and Section V aligns them with other evidence about the distribution of overall material well-being.
A. Adding Real Estate
The personal wealth covered by the probate-based estimates rose as a share of all household assets, from about 39 percent in the late seventeenth century to about 58 percent in 1875. The remaining share is real estate, or land and the structures affixed to it.
Twentieth-century scholars have worked carefully on the ownership of land between the sixteenth century and the nineteenth, generally concluding that it became more concentrated over the two centuries surveyed here, especially during the enclosure waves, With realty more unequally held than personalty but declining as a share of all wealth, care must be taken in estimating how the two major asset groups were correlated across individuals. The procedures used to combine the two are sketched in the Appendix. From 1670 through 1810, I have used rough data on the distribution of realty rents across occupational classes, capitalized these at historically observed capitalization rates, and compared them with the probatebased estimates of the distribution of personalty. The resulting ratios of realty to personalty by class were then applied to all individuals within each class, and the estate-multiplier technique was repeated. For the 1873-75 benchmark, it was possible to collate some realty with the personalty of its owners and make varying assumptions about the ownership of other realty, again yielding a distribution of' gross assets.
B. Debts and Net Worth
Since "wealth" is usually meant to refer to nonhuman net worth, debts must be estimated and subtracted from gross assets to chart wealth Extending our view of inequality of net worth from the old twentieth century frontier (1911-13) to 1670 has helped resolve a classic debate. To the extent that the debate between opposing ideological camps was a debate about the distribution of wealth, we get a mixed pattern.
Defining social inequality strictly in terms of gaps between class mean levels of net worth would yield a Marxian tale of sharply widening gaps across the century of Industrial Revolution. This widening, already shown for personal estate, would also show up in the distribution of net worth by class since there was no great diffusion of real estate away from the titled and merchant classes and no rise in their relative indebtedness. Marx wrote at a time when class wealth divisions in England were higher than they had been over the two preceding centuries. This trend reversed dramatically, of course, over the century after he wrote.
Defining social inequality in terms of the shares of nonhuman wealth held by the richest and the poorest, however, gives a very different result. Now that realty, personalty, and debts are all brought into the picture, the rise of (size distribution) wealth inequality after 1740 has been confined to a shift of relative wealth into the top percentile from the second to the fifth percentiles.
The lack of a clear trend between 1740 and 1911-13 does not give much comfort to either the pessimists or the optimists in the Victorian debate over trends in wealth inequality since both sides were asserting a net change. The optimists, such as Porter, Giffen, and Marshall, were probably wrong in implying that the gaps were narrowing across the Industrial Revolution and the nineteenth century. Marx, Engels, Shaw, and other critics were probably wrong in asserting a pronounced rise in wealth inequality.
Part of our empirical harvest, however, is a net set of puzzles. Why should the occupational, or "class," wealth gaps have behaved so differently from the size distribution of net worth before the twentieth century? And why should net worth inequality have moved so differently from income inequality? The full answer awaits a comprehensive causal accounting that weights the contributions of different exogenous change in the structure of the economy. Initial answers can be given in this paper, however.
The apparent quiescence of trends in net worth inequality before this century resulted from the near balancing of two strong trends: a broad-based tendency toward greater concentration of both income and wealth versus the egalitarian consequences of the diminishing importance of land and of the titled-landed class. The rising concentration of wealth implied by the widening of gaps between class averages was no mirage. But its impact on net worth was offset by the egalitarian effect of the pronounced shift away from real estate, especially land, summarized in table 3.
The role of the shift away from realty can be quantified with an accounting exercise. Suppose that the aggregate share of realty in total gross assets had not changed over the last three centuries. In this way, the assumption of a constatut depreciation rate gap between realty and all other assets implies a widening gap in the absolute miumber of years' purchase. 'Ihis asstuinptioti may be wrong, however. If the gap narrowed, under the influemice of longer hunian life expectaticy amid a rise iii the share of realty that is in depreciable structures rather than land, then the number of years' purchase for human assets and personal estate shotild have risen faster than I have assumed. If this was trite, I have understated the egalitarian effect of the shift away from realty, and both total wealth ctmrves in fig. 2 should have risen moore steeply between 1670 and 1875.
* If realty took the same aggregate share of gross nionihumani assets as in 1875.
should the trends in net worth inequality and in income inequality have differed for the era on which most controversy has centered? For any given share of realty in total nonhuman assets, wealth inequality and income inequality followed roughly the same path, as shown in figure 2. Neither rose before the middle of the eighteenth century. Then both rose until the middle of the nineteenth. Between about 1870 and 1913, there were no strong movements, though the distribution of income showed some sign of leveling. Both incomes and wealth became more equal after 1913 than (apparently) ever before.
As a corollary, we can conclude that the difference in trends between net worth inequality and income inequality was caused by a drift in the proportions in which different assets are combined. The concentrated asset, realty, always took a greater share of nonhuman wealth than of income. Accordingly, wealth was always more unequally distributed than income, and the decline in realty's share of the economy before 1875 brought an equalization that could mask any trend toward concentration of net worth but not the trend toward more unequal incomes.
If net worth and income had different inequality trends and were affected by the decline of land to different degrees, which of them is more appropriate as a measure of overall inequality? The debate over the gaps between the rich and poor was always vague, willing to slip between wealth measures and income measures without noting the distinction.
If we take care to define wealth broadly enough, the distinction between wealth and income matters very little. To be a measure of living standards, wealth must capitalize all assets yielding resources that can be consumed or bequeathed. Suppose that all human earnings were capitalized at some rate appropriate to assets with their degree of risk, depreciation, and illiquidity. Gregory King thought human earnings should be capitalized at 10-15 years' purchase (i.e., at 62/3-1 0 percent per annum) (Laslett 1973, p. 248) . While any choice of a discount rate is highly arbitrary when capitalizing human wealth that could be only rented and never sold, almost any reasonable rate would still make human capital approach, or surpass, half of all capital anytime in the last three centuries. With human capital at least matching nonhuman, the rising inequality of earnings across the Industrial Revolution century would have brought a rising concentration of true total wealth, just as it made income more unequal. Once wealth is defined broadly enough to pose as a true measure of material well-being, its historic inequality trends were essentially those shown by the top quantile income share, as can be seen by the movements of the measure of total wealth in table 5 and figure 2. Only the narrower concept of nonhuman wealth was dominated by real estate enough to show a different time profile.
One might try to argue that the narrower measure of nonhuman wealth was really what past social debaters had in mind more than total wealth or income. To the extent that it was, Marx and other critics were wrong about the trend in wealth concentration. Yet to the extent that they were talking about material well-being, the appropriate measure is either total wealth or total income. The inequality of material well-being followed a Kuznetsian pattern: it rose somewhat over the Industrial Revolution era, changed only slightly between the 1870s and 1913, and then equalized dramatically over the next 60 years. And there was a clear net change: no time between 1670 and 1913 found income or wealth as equally shared as they have been since the 1950s.
VI. Age and Wealth Inequality
Before further lessons are drawn from the estimates, we must address the possibility that all the movements observed are a mirage created by shifts in age distribution. To judge the distribution of material well-being, one must judge it over the life cycle. As several scholars have pointed out, inequality might remain the same, or might not even exist, for each age range yet appear to widen or contract in an aggregate cross-section just because of movements in the age distribution.13 Shifts in the adult age distribution could distort the overall distribution of wealth in two ways. A shift toward (or away from) age groups with more varied wealth could seem to raise (or lower) aggregate wealth inequality. Or a shift toward (or away from) age groups with extremely high and low wealth could artificially raise (or lower) inequality. For Britain in the nineteenth or twentieth century, wealth rises monotonically with age, even after age 60, so that wealth inequality would be affected by movements of the adult population toward or away from the middle age range.
It is possible to test for artificial age twists behind the apparent trends in English wealth inequality using the unique features of my 1875 data set. Ages at death, personal estate values, and holdings of real estate over one acre have been linked up for most of the 1875 probate sample. To quantify the effect of changes in the age distribution, one could ask the following kind of question: How far would the wealth distribution have departed from its (estimated) 1875 inequality if the same 1875 patterns of distribution within age groups were combined with the age distribution of some other setting?
The first such accounting experiment compares the "true" (preferred estimate) England and Wales of 1875 with a hypothetical England and Wales having the same patterns from 1875 but the age distribution of England and Wales in 1696. In this case, it turns out that the wealth share of the top 5 percent of adults in the hypothetical England would have been 1.15 percent lower with the older 1696 age distribution than with the actual 1875 distribution. That is, the shift to a younger population between 1696 and 1875 artificially raised the top 5 percent wealth share by 1.15 percent between 1696 and 1875. This is enough shift to explain all of the modest 1 percent rise in the top group's share of gross assets, or about two-thirds of the slightly greater rise in a similar group's share of net worth, and smaller shares of the rise in the inequality of total wealth or income. Thus a noteworthy part, at least, of the observed rise in English inequality before 1875 was due to age shifts alone. 14 Understanding the effect of differences in age distribution also helps us interpret the differences in wealth distribution between England and the United States. Among Americans in 1860, the top 10 percent of adult males, which about matches the top 5 percent of all adults, held only 73 percent of gross assets versus the 80.7 held by their English and Welsh counterparts in 1875. Gallman (1972) has argued that the United States would appear to have been more egalitarian than Edward Pessen implied if we could somehow adjust for the fact that the U.S. adult population was younger. While Pessen's assertions were not based on any hard data comparing countries or times and Gallman's counterargument used only hypothetical figures, we now have enough data to pass judgment. Gallman's conjecture was correct. If the English age-wealth patterns for 1875 were projected onto the white U.S. age distribution of 1860 (or 1870, with or without blacks), they would have given an extra 1 percent of wealth to the top 5 percent of adults. That is, the U.S.-age-adjusted version of English inequality would have been even further above the actual U.S. inequality, supporting Gallman's contention that the United States would have looked even more egalitarian when the age difference is factored out.
Thus far, we have seen, age comparisons suggest that a younger adult population has more unequal wealth than an older one for any given inequality in wealth at each stage of the adult life cycle. By 
VII. The Victorian Heights and Classical Economics
The economic disparities debated in Victorian and Edwardian times were clearly much greater than those in Britain today, and probably as great as those in any other major country anytime before World War I.'1( As we have seen, these economic gaps were not new, having widened only slowly (in the case of total wealth or income) or not at all (in the case of nonhuman wealth) since before the Industrial Revolution. Pessimists seeing an inexorable tendency for income and wealth to become concentrated into fewer and fewer hands were guilty of overstatement. The estimates are even less generous to Porter, Giffen, Marshall, and other optimists who thought that wealth and income were being spread more and more equally over the nineteenth century: the disparities were not narrowing, and those in income or total wealth were probably widening somewhat.
There is more to learn, however, about classical thinking on the subject of distribution than just that they misjudged inequality trends. Most classical treatises in political economy, in fact, said little about the size distribution of wealth or income itself. We must remember The produce of the earth-all that is derived from its surface by the united application of labour, machinery, and capital, is divided among three classes of the community, namely, the proprietor of the land, the owner of the stock or capital necessary for its cultivation, and the labourers by whose industry it is cultivated....
To determine the laws which regulate this distribution, is the principal problem in Political Economy.
The task of explaining the functional distribution of income derived its urgency from the fact that these classes had clear economic rankings. In Mill's words, the three "requisites of production" were also the three "main classes of society." Rich landlords got a further "accession of riches" from the labor and investment of others, which bid up the value of their land while they slept (Mill 1929 , esp. pp. 818-19 and bk. 2). Malthus and Marx similarly devoted themselves to theories of wages, profits, and rent, without having to remind themselves or readers which of these three rewards was the lot of the poor and which were the competing roads to riches. And each classical treatise was used to justify ways of redistributing income and wealth.
The stylized division of the economic ranks into three factors of production fit the British economy in which the classical economists lived far better than it fits today. Many writers have suspected as much, but the paucity of data and the frequent scholarly emphasis on the difference between status and wealth in English society threaten to obscure the point. This study has begun to quantify just how well one could frame the rich, middle, and poor classes with the classic triad of land, capital, and labor. The titled and merchant classes, already far richer than the rest of society, widened their advantage across the Industrial Revolution century, in the way Malthus, Ricardo, Mill, and Marx deplored.
Just how closely the economic ranks were tied to the three classic factors of production in the last century, and how much things have changed since, is underlined by table 6. In Victorian England and Wales, all clues suggest that nearly all land was owned by the top income decile, which also got far more of its income from capital, and far less from labor, than the rest of society. In such a world, one could well offer explanations of movements in the size distribution of income or wealth in terms of rent, profits, and wages. A century later, the economic ranks have become homogenized as far as the three factors are concerned. Now the top decile gets almost none of its income from land, and the share it gets from other property incomes is not that different from the share that property contributes to the incomes of the poorer 90 percent. Macroeconomic theories of rent, profits, and wages can no longer explain much change in the size distribution of income or wealth.
As a corollary, we can extend our relativistic appreciation of classical economists' distribution theory to their (relative) neglect of human capital differences as a source of income inequality. The return to human skill above the level of common labor accounted for a much smaller share of English and Welsh incomes in the last century than it does today. If we measure this return (the average price of skills times its quantity) as (Wae -w) N, where wave is the average wage, w, the unskilled wage rate, and N the man-hours of labor employed, then in 1867 the return to skilled labor was between 5 and 25 percent of national income. A century later, with the same definition, skills received between 46 and 58 percent of pretax household income.17 Ignoring the sources of inequality of skills was thus less of a handicap in explaining overall income distribution than it would be today.
We could even spare some slight appreciation for some of their conjectures about secular trends in unit land rents, profits, and wages. While the pessimistic belief that wages rates were pinned to subsistence should have been abandoned by midnineteenth century, real wages had not risen much before 1820 (Lindert and Williamson 1983a). Agricultural land rents had also risen faster than wage rates for three centuries, as Malthus and Ricardo guessed (Lindert 1983a) , and there is even a look of the "declining rate of profit" in the decline of real interest rates and the rental/purchase ratio on land noted earlier in this paper, though the residual share of profits in national income did not decline.
The classical treatises, however, were unable to pursue the distributional implications of the drift in factor income shares. The drift toward human skills and away from land had already begun in the eighteenth century. It imparted an egalitarian drift in a society originally dominated by landed wealth, even though no leveling could be seen by the unaided eye before this century. True, the price of land was rising faster than wage rates or returns on capital until the latter half of the nineteenth century. But Malthus, Ricardo, Mill, and (to a lesser extent) Marx may have focused too much on factor pricesthose rents, profit rates, and wage rates-and not enough on the rates of factor quantity growth or factor income shares. Even Marshall had to wrestle with his lingering Malthusian-Ricardian intuition that land would still dominate national income and check growth someday. It 17 For 1867, unskilled labor was defined as Baxter's bottom group, accounting for 28.9 percent of all earners. Its average income of ?24.85 was extended to all earners (skilled or not) to calculate returns to unskilled labor, amounting to 34.50 percent of all earnings. The returns to skill are the part of the total labor income in Result: Three sets of distributions of net worth.
